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INTRODUCTION 
This article addresses the extent to which national and international law 
regards the entitlement of communities to protect and preserve their 
intellectual property in the form of traditional knowledge, expressions of 
folklore, and genetic resources as a communal right. In particular, communal 
intellectual property is a right collectively held by communities over their 
intellectual property. Such rights arise because the creation, maintenance, 
enhancement, and transformation of intellectual property is done by the 
community as a whole. The communal nature of the right does not diminish 
the fact that individuals are the physical agents in the creation of communal 
intellectual property. Still, such contribution happens in the context of 
communal values, and often with the vision, supervision, and authority of the 
community. In general, the existence of communal creations and knowledge 
is universally acknowledged. Yet, it is a different matter when a claim is 
asserted that a community has exclusive rights over the products and the 
processes resulting from these creations and knowledge. This difference is 
where, both at the international and national level, heated debates and 
controversies have dominated the discussion about whether intellectual 
property rights could be asserted by communities as opposed to individuals. 
A simple way to approach this issue is to identify existing norms in 
national constitutions where such a communal intellectual property right is 
recognized.  Given that intellectual property rights are essentially territorial, 
the recognition by national constitutions of communal rights is usually, 
although not exclusively, the clearest evidence of the recognition of such 
rights. In this respect, this article argues that a combination of recent 
constitutional provisions in regions such as Latin America and Africa, as well 
as international treaty provisions, support the assertion of the existence of 
communal intellectual property rights. However, the lack of widespread state 
recognition of communal intellectual property rights, in the background of the 
ongoing controversy of the relationship between intellectual property and 
human rights, suggests that communal intellectual property rights are still 
emerging. That is, such rights have yet to be firmly established as a general 
legal principle in many jurisdictions.  Moreover, these rights confront 
significant obstacles as well, some of which are specifically addressed in this 
article. 
In this context, it is worth highlighting that part of the difficulty of 
asserting communal intellectual property rights is because the nature of 
intellectual property rights remains largely unclear. Given the controversies 
surrounding recognition of individual intellectual property rights in the 
background of the development of human rights as a liberal conception and 
protection of individual rights, it would appear problematic to assert that 
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communities have a right to their intellectual output.  Still, provisions in 
international treaties such as Article 15 of the International Covenant for 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights—as well as Article 27 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights—do offer some support for the recognition of 
intellectual property rights as human rights. Moreover, the recent 
jurisprudence1 from national courts, the European Court of Human Rights, 
and the European Court of Justice has established that the right to property 
protects intellectual property,2 and that intellectual property and human rights 
remain valuable individual rights.3 As a result of these decisions, it no longer 
seems possible to disregard the importance of intellectual property as a human 
right. 
Similarly, even though a number of national constitutions do not 
recognize intellectual property rights,4 several others do. Accordingly, if 
intellectual property is protected as a part of the right to property in these 
constitutions, the fact that some constitutions recognize collective rights of 
communities seems to support the assertion that, in addition to individual 
intellectual property rights, there may also be a peoples’ right to communal 
intellectual property.5 Within this context, this article supports the right of 
 
1. See Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the 
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1 (2008). 
2. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 1, Protocol 1,  1952, 213 UNTS 262.  
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The 
preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.  
Id.; see also LAURENCE R. HELFER & G. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE (2011). In the United States there is considerable dicta that 
recognizes intellectual property as property at least within the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Chavez 
v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 605 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Since patent and copyright are of a 
similar nature, and patent is a form of property [within the meaning of the Due Process Clause] . . . 
copyright would seem to be so too.”); Lane v. First Nat’l Bank, 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1989).   
3. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger, The Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 111 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2008). 
4. Note, however, that in the certification process leading up to the adoption of the FC, there 
was a proposal to include the right to intellectual property in the FC. See Certification of the 
Constitution of Republic of South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at 48 para. 75 (S. Afr.). When 
the Constitution came before the Constitutional Court, the Court was urged to recognize the right to 
hold intellectual property because it is a universally accepted human right. Id. at 48, ¶ 75 (stating that 
the Court held the right to hold intellectual property is not a universally accepted fundamental human 
right and that the FC is not defective thereby). See O.H. Dean, The Case for the Recognition of 
Intellectual Property in the Bill of Rights, 1997 (60) THRHR 105 (SA) at 105 (S. Afr.). 
5. See Jack Donnelly, Human Rights, Individual Rights and Collective Rights, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD: INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES 49 (Jan Berting et al. eds., 
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communities over their products and processes that derives from their 
creativity and knowledge which is better described as a peoples’ right.6 A 
peoples’ right is a group right that belongs to the people who hold the right.7  
Starting from this proposition, this article seeks to address the challenges that 
the bearers of this peoples’ right face with respect to claiming communal 
intellectual property rights, as well as the nature and content of this right and 
its relationship to human rights in general. In particular, Part II addresses the 
legal basis of communal intellectual property rights in international treaties 
and national laws. Part III attempts to dissect the difficult questions 
concerning the recognition and acceptance of a right to communal intellectual 
property, including: identifying the bearers, the specific content, and the limits 
that define the scope of this right. 
I. THE RIGHT TO COMMUNAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS AND NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 
In this section, I explore the normative foundations of the right to 
communal intellectual property in international instruments and national 
constitutions. It is the recognition of this right in national constitutions that 
justifies the assertion that a right to communal intellectual property exists in 
addition to the recent jurisprudence interpreting regional human rights 
treaties, such as the American Convention of Human Rights.  To illustrate this 
point, examples are drawn from the recognition of collective rights in the 
constitutions of certain Latin American countries, coupled with the decisions 
emanating from the American Convention of Human Rights. In addition, 
recent constitutional proposals from Kenya, Egypt, and Tunisia are explored 
with respect to the potential recognition of intellectual property rights in these 
constitutions, as well as the protection of group rights as it is found in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.8 
 
1990); John Nordenfeldt, Human Rights - What They Are and What They are Not, 56 NORDIC J. 
INT’L L. 1, 7 (1987).  
6. See T. van Boven, The Relation Between Peoples’ Rights and Human Rights in the African 
Charter, 7 H.R.L.J. 183 (1986). 
7. See Peter Jones, Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 80, 
82 (1999). 
8. See African Charter of Human Rights art. 19, June 27, 1981 (noting the equality of all 
peoples); African Charter of Human Rights art. 20 (involving rights to existence); African Charter of 
Human Rights art. 21 (the right to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources); African 
Charter of Human Rights art. 22 (stating the right to their economic, social, and cultural 
development); African Charter of Human Rights art. 23 (noting the right to national and international 
peace and security); and African Charter of Human Rights art. 24 (stating the right to general 
satisfactory environment). 
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A. The Right to Communal Intellectual Property in Latin America and the 
Right to Property in the American Convention of Human Rights 
The fact that communal intellectual property is implicated in the 
collective rights of indigenous people is based on the jurisprudence that has 
developed around Article 21 of the American Convention of Human Rights 
(American Convention), which recognizes communal property. In this regard, 
Article 219 of the American Convention has become the fulcrum of the 
collective rights of indigenous and tribal peoples.  In a number of decisions, 
including Saramaka v. Suriname,10 Awas Tigni v. Nicaragua,11 Yakya-Axa v. 
Paraguay,12 Moiwana Village v. Suriname,13 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay,14 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v, 
Paraguay,15 and Sarayaku v. Ecuador,16 the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has recognized the rights of tribal and indigenous peoples to communal 
property based principally on Article 21 of the American Convention.17 These 
decisions were particularly relevant because the Court did not significantly 
differentiate between indigenous peoples and other tribal peoples in reaching 
 
9. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969. 
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may 
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.  
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for 
reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms 
established by law.  
3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law. 
Id.  
10. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 96 (Nov. 28, 2007), interpreted by Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) 
No. 185 (2008) [hereinafter Saramaka].   
11. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 79, ¶¶149, 153, 155 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
12. Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 154–56 (June 17, 2005).  
13. Moiwana Cmty v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶¶134–35 (June 15, 2005) [hereinafter Moiwana]. 
14. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶144 (Mar. 29, 2006) 
15. Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶¶85–89 (Aug. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Xákmok Kásek].  
16. Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶145 (June 27, 2012). 
17. See generally Thomas M. Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous 
Peoples and the Inter-American Court, 35 U. PA. INT’L L. 113 (2013); Jo M. Pasqualucci, 
International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American court of 
Human Rights in the Light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 51 (2009). 
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its conclusions in the various cases.18 
In Yakya Axa, for example, the Inter-American Court recognized the 
“right to cultural Identity” even though such right is not expressly stated in the 
American Convention. In Xákmok Kásek, the Court linked the right to cultural 
identity to Article 21 of the American Convention. The nature of the right to 
property recognized by Article 21 was reconfigured in Saramaka to include 
the right of tribal and indigenous communities to “freely determine and enjoy 
their own social cultural and economic development . . . . “19 In this case, the 
Court further held that tribal and indigenous communities “may continue 
living their traditional way of life, and that their distinct cultural identity, 
social structure, economic system, customs, beliefs and traditions are 
respected, guaranteed and protected by States.”20 In addition to recognizing 
the right to communal property, the Court in Sarayaku also recognized, for 
the first time, that indigenous people suffered harm as a group.  This approach 
broke from the traditional focus of individual harm and embraced a group 
focus in facilitating protection for the community as group. 
As a result, even though these decisions concerned primarily land-related 
interests, there is little doubt that the reasoning of the Court in these decisions 
can be extended to create the basis for recognizing the right to communal 
intellectual property.21 However, the decision leaves unanswered the question 
of whether the identified obligations, arising out of Article 21 of the American 
Convention, require the effective participation of tribal and indigenous 
people.  In general, these decisions seem to indicate that the recognition of a 
right to communal intellectual property would nonetheless require other 
practical manifestations, such as the ability to exclude third parties from the 
property, which are closely related to the nature of the property. That said, the 
acknowledgment that intellectual property can be likened to both real property 
and potentially communal property (according to Article 21 of the American 
Convention) is important since these elements can greatly contribute to a 
general recognition of a right to communal intellectual property. 
The right to communal intellectual property is also found in a number of 
Latin American national constitutions. Bolivia and Ecuador, for example, 
recognize multinational and intercultural states within their countries and 
accordingly recognize their collective rights, including their rights to culture 
 
18. See Moiwana, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 124, ¶86(5) (2006). . 
19. Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. 185, ¶95 (2007). 
20. Id. at ¶121. 
21. See Maria Dolores Mino, Traditional Knowledge under International Human Rights Law: 
Applying Standards of Communitarian Property over Ancestral Lands to Traditional Knowledge-
Related Claims, SELECTED WORKS 1, 22 (2011), available at http://bepress.com
/mariadolores_mino/1 (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).  
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and intellectual property.22 In particular, Article 57 of the Ecuador 
Constitution of 2008 recognizes a number of collective rights of indigenous 
communes, people, and nations that include a right to uphold, protect, and 
develop their collective knowledge, science, technologies, ancestral wisdom, 
and genetic resources; and it prohibits all forms of appropriation of such 
knowledge, innovations, and practices. Similarly, the Political Constitution of 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia (from 2009) protects the collective rights of 
the indigenous people of Bolivia. 
B. The Right to Communal Intellectual Property in Africa and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Recent constitutional provisions adopted in Kenya, Egypt,23 and Tunisia24 
suggest the possibility of the recognition of a right to communal intellectual 
property when interpreted within the jurisprudence relating to “group rights” 
as provided in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter). In particular, section 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Kenya, 2010, recognizes culture as the foundation of the nation and requires 
the State to promote the intellectual property rights of the people of Kenya. 
The same section enjoins the Parliament from enacting legislation on two 
items. First, to ensure that communities receive compensation or royalties for 
use of their cultures and cultural heritage; and second, to recognize and 
protect ownership of indigenous seeds and plant varieties, their genetic and 
diverse characteristics, and their use by communities in Kenya.  Article 40(5) 
further provides that the State shall support, promote, and protect the 
intellectual property rights of the people of Kenya. 
A cumulative interpretation of these Constitutional provisions supports 
the assertion that the Kenyan Constitution recognizes communal intellectual 
property rights. It is arguable however that what is conceived by the 
constitutional provisions is merely individual property rights since Article 
40(5) appears as part of the right to property in the Bill of Rights of the 
Kenyan Constitution. Similar considerations apply to an interpretation of 
Article 69 of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution and Article 41 of the 2014 
Tunisian Constitution. While it may be argued that these provisions relate to 
individual rights to intellectual property, the cast of these provisions does not 
 
22. See Rodrigo Uprimny, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin 
America: Trends and Challenges, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1590 (2011); see generally Jorge L. 
Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2008). 
23. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, 18 Jan. 
2014, art. 69 (“The State shall protect all types of intellectual property rights in all fields . . .”).   
24. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 26 Jan. 2014, art. 41 (“The right to 
property shall be guaranteed . . .”).   
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rule out communal intellectual property. 
At the regional level, the African Charter contains a number of rights that 
can be said to recognize communal intellectual property rights.25 For instance, 
in Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 
Group (on Behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenya,26 the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights recognized the right to property 
of the Endorois people, making it plausible that the right to their communal 
intellectual property27 would also be recognized in appropriate circumstances. 
II. DIFFICULT QUESTIONS BORDERING THE RIGHT TO COMMUNAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
In this section, two difficult questions concerning the right to communal 
intellectual property are addressed as a means of clarifying the bearers and 
scope of this right. It is crucial to determine the communities that are entitled 
to this right, as well as the content of their entitlement. 
A. The Bearers of the Right to Communal Intellectual Property 
The first conceptual challenge to address, in regards to recognizing the 
right to communal intellectual property, is the identification of the groups that 
qualify as “people” who, in turn, will be bearers of this right. Without 
adequately confronting this challenge, the right would be of doubtful practical 
assistance and incapable of enforcement.28 The challenge in this respect is 
primarily due to the difficulty of defining and understanding the concepts of 
“culture” and “communities” as an abstraction emanating from beliefs, 
practices, and values that are shared among the community, as well as 
recognizing the “institutions” that identify the members of such community.29 
 
25.  African Charter of Human Rights, June 27, 1981. The following rights are peoples’ rights 
in the Charter: the equality of all peoples (Article 19); rights to existence (Article 20); right to freely 
to dispose of their wealth and natural resources (Article 21); right to their economic social and 
cultural development (Article 22); right to national and international peace and security (Article 23); 
and right to general satisfactory environment (Article 24). Id. Article 22(1) of the Charter provides 
that “[a]ll Peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due 
regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.” 
Id.   
26. Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on Behalf 
of Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenya, (2009) App.276/03., 46th Ord. Session (Kenya). Available at 
www.minorityrights.org/download.php@id=748 (last accessed Apr. 17, 2015). 
27. See id. at ¶238 (“[T]he African Commission agrees with the Complainants that the 
Property of the Endorois people has been severely encroached upon and continues to be so 
encroached upon.”). 
28. See Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, A Critique of the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights, 31 HOW. L.J. 643, 656-57 (1988). 
29. See Janusz Symonides, Cultural rights: a neglected category of human rights, 158 INT’L 
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Ultimately, delineating the bearers of this communal right remains a question 
to be resolved based on the social construct or blood descent of a community, 
the language, the geographical contiguity, and the religion around which such 
community is organized. That definition should entitle the community to its 
right of a communal culture.  Not surprisingly, communities that are 
organized around blood descent are usually ethnic communities, which often 
share language and other cultural traits. Indigenous people are most frequently 
part of these communities and are the potential bearers of this communal 
right. As noted by Siegfred Wiessner,30 community-related groups can 
additionally be distinguished between “organic groups” and “non-organic 
groups.” While the former refers to communities “who have made and 
maintain a conscious decision . . . which manifests in their will to live 
together as a community,”31 non-organic groups “do not have the same 
interest in sharing all aspects of life.”32  In this respect, organic groups may 
deserve protection by reason of their peculiarities of sharing all aspects of 
their life together, while other non-organic groups may not deserve the same 
or any protection at all. 
While a genuine case can be made for the recognition of the communal 
rights of indigenous people, the same can be said of other communities 
especially if communal intellectual property is an expression of the identity of 
the communities as a whole. It would appear that the recognition of ethnic 
communities as bearers of collective rights is settled for a number of reasons. 
First, a number of national constitutions appear to recognize rights of ethnic 
communities. Examples include the constitutions of a number of Latin 
American countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador.  In addition, the Kenyan 
Constitution recognizes marginalized communities as including indigenous 
people, traditional communities, pastoral persons, and communities living at 
the fringe of the Kenyan society. It thus appears that ethnic communities are 
at the heart of the meaning of communities, and thus of communal rights.33 
Second, the analysis of the jurisprudence under Article 21 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights indicate that tribal communities, in addition to 
indigenous communities, have been recognized as bearers of the right to 
property. Third, decisions of the African Commission recognize “peoples” as 
part of groups but without any special significance reserved for indigenous 
 
SOC. SCI. J. 559, 561 (1998). 
30. See Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and 
Continuing Challenges, 22 E.J.I.L. 121, 125 (2011). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. See CONSTITUTION, art. 260 (2010) (Kenya). 
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peoples.34 This position could perhaps be explained given the peculiar 
historical development of Africa where it can be asserted that there are no 
indigenous people in a strict sense. That is, usually the claim to “indigenity” is 
functionally designed to draw attention to marginalized communities.35 In 
summary, it could be concluded that indigenous communities, including 
ethnic communities, can generally be considered to be entitled to a right to 
communal intellectual property. 
Given this background, whether other socially based communities are so 
entitled will continue to be a debated subject.  For example, arguments have 
been advanced that the definition and meaning of culture recognizes that 
communities are social constructs that can be organized around other social 
facts, which may not be intrinsically less important than blood or descent. For 
example, communities can be organized around religious beliefs. Since there 
is no implicit association of culture with ethnicity, other socially based 
communities deserve recognition and the protection of their intellectual 
property. International cultural property law has long recognized religious 
books, monuments, artifacts, and sites as cultural property,36 and it would be 
difficult to assert that communities organized around other social facts are less 
entitled to protection of their expressions.  Accordingly, religious 
communities, as an example, may be entitled to claim a right to communal 
intellectual property over their intellectual creations. 
B. The Scope of the Right to Communal Intellectual Property 
The scope of the right to communal intellectual property, and the extent to 
which the recognition of this right prevents non-members of the community to 
access the content that is protected, is another difficult issue that confronts the 
legitimacy of the right to communal intellectual property and remains central 
to its enforcement. One way to articulate the scope of protection of this right 
is to examine the emerging perspectives in this respect at the international, 
regional, and national levels. As I elaborate below, two narratives can be 
identified at the international level that could assist in defining the scope of 
the right to communal intellectual property. The first narrative revolves 
around Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),37 while the second narrative is supplied by the 
 
34. See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Advisory Opinion, at ¶¶9–13 (2007), available at 
www.achpr.org/files/special-mechanisms/indigenous-popultions/un_advisory_opinion_idp_eng.pdf.  
35. Id. at ¶¶1, 15, 19.  
36. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, art. 1, Nov. 16, 1972. 
37. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 15(1), Dec. 16, 
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United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP).38  In 
addition, other narratives and examples can be found at the regional and 
national level, including in the Americas, Europe, and Africa. 
1. The International Convention on Social and Cultural Rights 
The narrative supplied by Article 15(1)(a) and (c) of the ICESCR regards 
the right to communal intellectual property as consisting of two parts. The 
first part can be said to refer to the communal enjoyment by the community 
and its members of their intellectual property and the concomitant right to 
determine how third parties can have access to their property. Their collective 
enjoyment of the right is better understood in a negative sense as entitling 
communities to restrict access to their intellectual property in accordance with 
their rules processes and norms also described as their customary law.39 The 
second part of the right to communal intellectual property requires, it is 
submitted, the access of members of the community and third parties to 
communal intellectual property in properly defined circumstances.40 This 
narrative is enhanced by the authoritative interpretation of Articles 15(1)(a) 
and 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR by the United Nations Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR).41 While General Comment No. 21 
(GC 21)42 provides the content to Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR, General 
Comment No. 17 (GC 17)43 provides content to article 15(1)(c) of the 
 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
38. See generally U.N. GAOR, 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
(recording of 143  in favor and 4 against—Canada, United States, New Zealand—and 11 abstentions 
including  three African States-Burundi, Kenya, Nigeria). In 2010 New Zealand Canada and the 
United States formally endorsed the declaration meaning that no country opposes the DRIP.  See 
United States Finally Endorses Historic United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples 36 NARF LEGAL REV. 1 (2011), available at http://www.narf.org/about-us/legal-review/.  
39. See, e.g., Erica-Irene Daes, Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Protection of the 
heritage of indigenous people, ¶ 3–9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26/annex (June 21, 1995). Also, 
Daes affirmed “the applicability of customary law as the ultimate determinant of rights and 
responsibilities in relation to indigenous cultural and intellectual heritage.” Erica-Irene Daes, 
Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., 95th Annual Mtg., at 147 (Apr. 
4–7, 2001). 
40. See, e.g., G. Davies Copyright and the Public Interest (Thomson, Sweet and Maxwell 
2002) 7 (emphasizing that protection and access as the dual purpose of copyright. It is submitted that 
this is a general feature of all intellectual property rights and therefore feasible for a communal 
intellectual property right.) 
41. Of note, comments of the CESCR are important as they provide guidance to State parties 
to the ICESCR as to the nature and meaning of the ICESCR. 
42. Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), Gen. Cmt. No. 21, 43d Sess., U.N. Doc. No. 
E/c.12/GC/21, (2009) [hereinafter GC 21]. 
43. The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests 
resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She is the Author 
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ICESCR. The first component of the right to communal intellectual property 
is found in Article 15(1)(c) of the International Convenant of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, which provides for the right for everyone to 
benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific activity. The scope of GC 17  made by the UNCESCR can be 
found in paragraph 1 of the document and includes a recognition that 
“[h]uman rights are fundamental, inalienable, and universal entitlements 
belonging to individuals and, under certain circumstances, groups of 
individuals and communities.”44 Paragraph 8 of GC 17  defines “everyone” in 
Article 15(1)(c) to include communities or groups of individuals. The 
meaning of scientific literary or artistic production is explained to include 
knowledge, innovations, and practices of indigenous and local communities.45 
The UNCESCR outlined the general legal obligations of State Parties in 
paragraph 28.46 Specific legal obligations can be found in paragraph 32. The 
Committee recommends that states adopt measures to ensure the effective 
protection of the interests of indigenous peoples taking into account the 
preferences of these people. A protection framework is recommended by the 
UNCESCR, and its features might include: (i) measures to recognize, register, 
and protect the individual or collective authorship of indigenous peoples 
under national intellectual property rights regimes; (ii) measures that prevent 
the unauthorized use by third parties of scientific literary and artistic 
productions of indigenous people; (iii) the principle of free prior and informed 
consent of the indigenous authors concerned; (iv) respect for the oral or other 
customary forms of transmission of their indigenous peoples’ intellectual 
productions; (v) the collective administration by indigenous peoples of the  
benefits derived from their productions.47 These features create a positive 
protection regime for the expressions of folklore under Article 15(1)(c). One 
failing on the part of GC 17  is the diminished autonomy for communities 
 
(Art.15, Para. 1(c ) of the Covenant) Gen Comt No. 17, U.N. Doc. No. E/C.12/GC/17 (2006) 
[hereinafter GC 17]. 
44. Id. at ¶1. 
45. Id. at ¶9. 
46. Id. at ¶41. The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material 
benefits resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he or she is the author, 
like all human rights, imposes three types or levels of obligations on States parties: the obligations to 
respect, protect, and fulfill. Id. at ¶48. The obligation to respect requires State parties to refrain from 
interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests of the author.  Id. The obligation to protect requires State parties to take 
measures that prevent third parties from interfering with the moral and material interests of authors. 
Id. Finally, the obligation to fulfill requires State parties to adopt appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional, and other measures towards the full realization of 
article 15, paragraph 1(c). Id. 
47. Id. at ¶32. 
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because it makes no reference to the customary laws and protocols that is the 
normative framework within which communities protect their intellectual 
capital.  That said, one profound achievement of GC 17  is the recognition 
that the cultural rights of communities are not absolute.  Paragraph 22  of GC 
17  makes the Article 15(1)(c) rights  subject to limitations and requires it to 
be balanced with the other rights recognized in the ICESCR. Such limitations 
must be determined by law in a manner compatible with the nature of these 
rights and must be strictly necessary for the promotion of the general welfare 
in a democratic society in accordance with Article 4 of the ICESCR. 
Paragraph 23 of GC 17  provides that limitations must be proportionate, 
meaning that the least restrictive measures must be adopted when several 
types of limitations may be imposed.  Limitations must be compatible with 
the very nature of the rights protected in Article 15(1)(c), which lies in the 
protection of the personal link between the communities and their creation, 
and of the means which are necessary to enable communities to enjoy an 
adequate standard of living.  GC 17 further requires, in  paragraph 24, that the 
imposition of limitations may, under certain circumstances, require 
compensatory measures, such as payment of adequate compensation for the 
use of scientific, literary, or artistic productions in the public interest. It is 
submitted that Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR is an example of the limitation 
envisaged by paragraph 22 of GC 17,  and it is considered in the next section. 
The second component of the right to communal property as advanced by 
this narrative is found in Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR, which provides for 
the right to take part in cultural life. As stated above, GC 21 affirms that the 
right of everyone to take part in cultural life is closely related to other cultural 
rights in Article 15(1) of the ICESCR.48 In paragraph 6, the right to take part 
in cultural life is recognized as a freedom that requires “both abstention (i.e., 
non-interference with the exercise of cultural practices and with access to 
cultural goods and services) and positive action (ensuring preconditions for 
participation, facilitation and promotion of cultural life, and access to and 
preservation of cultural goods).”49 GC 21 began an analysis of Article 
15(1)(a) by considering the meaning of “everyone” and stating that the “term 
‘everyone’ in the first line of Article 15 may denote the individual or the 
collective; in other words, cultural rights may be exercised by a person (a) as 
an individual, (b) in association with others, or (c) within a community or 
group, as such.”50 The meaning of the term “to participate” was examined in 
 
48. Note that in paragraph 3 of GC 21, the fact that paragraph 1 of the Universal Decalartion 
of Human Rights recognizes the right of everyone to take part in cultural life. GC 21, supra note 41, 
at ¶3. 
49. GC 21, supra note 42, at ¶ 6. 
50. Id. at ¶9. 
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GC 21, which stated in paragraph 15 that it has three interrelated components 
that are “(a) participation in,51 (a) access52 to, and (c) contribution to cultural 
life.”53 The elements of the right to take part in cultural life are first 
availability, accessibility, acceptability, adaptability and appropriateness 
(which refers to the “realization of the right in a way that is respectful of the 
culture and cultural rights of individuals and communities”54). Paragraphs 17 
to 20 of GC 21 deal with limitations to the right to take part in cultural life.55 
Of particular importance in the context of this article is paragraph 19, which 
provides that: 
Applying limitations to the right of everyone to take part in cultural 
life may be necessary in certain circumstances, in particular in the 
case of negative practices, including those attributed to customs and 
traditions, that infringe upon other human rights. Such limitations 
must pursue a legitimate aim, be compatible with the nature of this 
right and be strictly necessary for the promotion of general welfare in 
a democratic society, in accordance with article 4 of the Covenant. 
Any limitations must therefore be proportionate, meaning that the 
least restrictive measures must be taken when several types of 
 
51. Id. at ¶15(a). 
Participation covers in particular the right of everyone—alone, or in association with others 
or as a community—to act freely, to choose his or her own identity, to identify or not with 
one or several communities or to change that choice, to take part in the political life of 
society, to engage in one’s own cultural practices and to express oneself in the language of 
one’s choice. Everyone also has the right to seek and develop cultural knowledge and 
expressions and to share them with others, as well as to act creatively and take part in 
creative activity;  
Id. 
52. Id. at ¶15(b) 
Access covers in particular the right of everyone—alone, in association with others or as a 
community—to know and understand his or her own culture and that of others  through 
education and information, and to receive quality education and training with due regard 
for cultural identity. Everyone has also the right to learn about forms of expression and 
dissemination through any technical medium of information or communication, to follow a 
way of life associated with the use of cultural goods and resources such as land, water, 
biodiversity, language or specific institutions, and to benefit from the cultural heritage and 
the creation of other individuals and communities[.] 
53. Id. at ¶15 (noting that the citations inside the quote were added) 
Contribution to cultural life refers to the right of everyone to be involved in creating the 
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional expressions of the community. This is 
supported by the right to take part in the development of the community to which a person 
belongs, and in the definition, elaboration and implementation of policies and decisions 
that have an impact on the exercise of a person’s cultural rights. 
54. Id. at ¶16(e). 
55. Id. at ¶¶17–19. 
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limitations may be imposed.56 
Paragraph 19 also lists the human rights that are “intrinsically linked to 
the right to take part in cultural life, such as the rights to privacy, to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion, to freedom of opinion and expression, to 
peaceful assembly and to freedom of association.”57 Of the five core 
obligations of Article 15(1)(a) listed by paragraph 55, the fourth obligation on 
state parties to the ICESCR that is especially relevant is “[t]o eliminate any 
barriers or obstacles that inhibit or restrict a person’s access to the person’s 
own culture or to other cultures, without discrimination and without 
consideration for frontiers of any kind.”58  The academic commentary on the 
significance of GC 21 dwells on how Article 15(1)(a) could impact 
intellectual property rights. Lee Shaver argues that states should work 
nationally and internationally to immediately implement legal reforms to 
eliminate unjustified barriers to access knowledge, expand exceptions and 
limitations, and ensure that penalties for copyright infringement are 
proportionate.59 Tzen Wong, among other academics, argues that GC 21 
enables us “to rethink what public access to cultural works ought to entail.”60 
Even though the access of the public to communal intellectual property has 
not been at issue, there is little doubt that GC 21 supports the access to 
communal intellectual property in appropriate circumstances. It is significant 
that GC 21 tracks and identifies those human rights—such as the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; right to freedom of association and right 
to freedom of thought, belief and religion— that are closely related to Article 
15(1)(a) because in many cases it will be these rights which are put forward as 
the basis of a request of individual access to communal intellectual property.61 
These human rights define, in more specific terms, the entitlements that seek 
ventilation. Article 15(1)(a) may therefore be regarded as an omnibus 
limitation clause affirming the importance of limitations. Thus, while Article 
15(1)(a) serves as an internal limitation to Article 15(1)(c), other human rights 
closely related to Article 15(1)(a) serve as external limitations. It is important 
to understand that Article 15(1)(a) stakes a claim as an equal partner in the 
 
56. Id. at ¶19. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at ¶55(d). 
59. See Lee Shaver & Caterina Sganga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On 
Copyright and Human Rights, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 637 (2009). 
60. See Tzen Wong et al., Cultural Diversity and the Arts: Contemporary Challenges for 
Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 2 (Tzen Wong et al., 
eds., 2011), available at www.piipa.org. 
61. See GC 21, supra note 42, at ¶55. 
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right to communal intellectual property. Without such a claim of equality, the 
right of communities to moral and material interests of their creation would be 
dominant, allowing only a few measured limitations. Without a limitations 
provision in the form of Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR, the control of 
communities over their intellectual capital will go overboard and important 
public interests will not be achieved.62 Swathes of knowledge in communal 
intellectual property important for advancement of society may be locked as a 
result of the exclusive rights of communities. Article 15(1)(a) introduces a 
balance in the right to communal intellectual property.63 
2.  The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Another narrative, as stated above, is the one that is woven around the 
DRIP, whose importance includes the fact that the DRIP contains a catalogue 
of rights of indigenous people that provide a clue as to the content of the right 
to communal intellectual property.64 In this respect, the right to communal 
intellectual property is articulated in a number of ways. 
First, in Article 11(1), the DRIP provides that indigenous people have the 
right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs.65 “This 
includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future 
manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, 
artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts 
and literature.”66  Paragraph 2 of Article 11 directs States to “provide redress 
through effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, developed in 
conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, 
intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and 
informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.”67 
Second, Article 31(1) provides that: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and 
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional 
cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, 
technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, 
seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral 
 
62. See, e.g., Michael F. Brown, Can Culture be Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 193, 199 (1998). 
63. See GC 21, supra note 42, at ¶15(a). 
64. See Chidi Oguamanam, Indigenuos Peoples’ Rights at the Intersection of Human Rights 
and Intellectual Property Rights, 18 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 261, 277 (2014). 
65. U.N. GAOR, supra note 38, at art. 11(1).   
66. Id. 
67. Id. at art. 11(2).  
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traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual 
and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, 
protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural 
heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.68 
Again, Article 31(2) directs States—in conjunction with indigenous 
people—to take effective measures to recognize and protect the exercise of 
these rights.69 The rights of indigenous people, however, are not absolute. 
Notably, Article 46 provides that indigenous people must exercise their rights 
within the context of the Charter of the United Nations and within the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.70 
These limitations are to be determined by law and in accordance with 
international human rights obligations.71 “Any such limitations shall be non-
discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting 
the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.”72 It 
appears that the envisaged limitations will have to pass a high muster, making 
the entitlements of indigenous people higher than permissible limitations. 
Thus, the balance of the right to communal property in the DRIP tilts in 
favor of the entitlements of indigenous peoples. There are a number of 
conclusions to be drawn from a comparison of the frameworks of Articles 
15(1)(a) and (b) of the ICESCR as well as the DRIP.  First, the right to 
communal intellectual property consists of a two part structure of control over 
the intellectual capital of communities and access to their intellectual capital 
of equal parts. Second, the manner in which control over the intellectual 
capital of communities is cast is flexible. It is not clear that the control of the 
intellectual property of communities should be achieved by the grant of 
exclusive rights even though this appears likely, especially in the provisions 
of DRIP. Third, the recognition of the normative framework of communities 
in the form of their customary law as a basis of their control over their 
communal intellectual property is crucial and may be part of the recognition 
by States of the right to communal property of communities. Fourth, the 
facilitation of access to the communal intellectual property of indigenous 
people will largely result from the claims made by individuals based on a 
number of human rights including: the freedom of expression; the right to 
privacy; the right to property; and the right to dignity. This Article now turns 
 
68. Id. at art. 31(1). 
69. Id. at art. 31(2). 
70. Id. at art. 46(1). 
71. Id. at art. 46(2). 
72. Id.  
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to a consideration of regional initiatives that suggest a content of the right to 
communal intellectual property. 
3. Regional and National Approaches 
At a regional level, it would appear that the content of a right to 
communal property is to be found in the right to property. The possibility of 
protecting communal intellectual property under the right to property in the 
American Convention for Human Rights was noted earlier in this Article. 
That possibility also exists with respect to the African Charter. This is not 
strange since there is abundant evidence that intellectual property is 
conceivable and protectable as property in national constitutions and regional 
treaties. A number of examples will suffice. 
First, the European Court of Human Rights, in a number of decisions 
interpreting Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Melynchuk v. Ukraine73; Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Portugal74; 
Balan v. Moldova75; and Ashby Donald v. France76), has asserted that there 
can be no doubt that Article 1 of Protocol Number 1 is applicable to 
intellectual property. In interpreting Article 17(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European Court of Justice 
has stated that the protection of the right to intellectual property is indeed 
enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union77 (the Charter). “There is, however, nothing whatsoever in 
the wording of that provision or in the Court’s case-law to suggest that that 
right is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely protected.”78 It is 
therefore appropriate to imagine that the right to communal intellectual 
property could be conceived as a property right, albeit in a collective sense. 
One of the consequences of the recognition of intellectual property as part of 
the right to property by European Courts79 is the requirement of a balancing 
exercise to align the right to property with other fundamental rights.80 At a 
 
73. Melynchuk v. Ukraine, App. No. 28753/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). 
74. Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007) (confirming 
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights).  
75. Balan v. Moldova, App. No. 19247/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008). 
76. Ashby Donald v. France, App. No. 36769/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013).  
77. 2000 O.J. (C 364) 12. (“ Intellectual Property shall be Protected.”). 
78. See Case C-70/10, Scarlett Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et 
éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-12025, ¶43.   
79. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property 
and the European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV.  INT’L L.J. 1 (2008). 
80. Id.; see also C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers 
CVBA (SABAM) v. Netlog NV, 2012 E.C.R. 1, 9, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris
/document. 
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national level, there is abundant evidence that intellectual property is 
protected as a right to property.81 
As a matter of design it has become fashionable for constitutions to 
expressly mandate the statutory elaboration of fundamental human and 
peoples’ rights. We have seen this with respect to the Kenyan Constitution, 
which requires legislation to express constitutional affirmations of the rights 
of Kenyan people to their intellectual property. Any such legislation would 
certainly be in furtherance of the right to communal intellectual property. It is 
interesting that the statutory elaboration occurs even when the constitutional 
basis of statute is unclear. A good example of this manner of statutory 
elaboration is found in the December 2013 South African legislation, which is 
the Intellectual Property Amendment Act 2013 (IPAA 2013) that seeks to 
“provide for the recognition and protection of certain manifestations of 
indigenous knowledge as a species of intellectual property.”82 To this end, 
IPAA 2013 amends a number of intellectual property legislation83 by: 
recognizing copyright in traditional works; recognizing traditional terms and 
expressions; making provisions for geographical indications; recognizing 
traditional designs; and protecting performances of traditional works. Both the 
National Environmental Management: Bio-Diversity Act84 and the IPAA 
2013 constitute an elaborate statutory framework for the protection of 
communal intellectual property in South Africa.  The extent to which the 
absence of a right to communal intellectual property in the South African Bill 
of Rights will affect the interpretation of IPAA 2013 remains to be seen.  It is 
very likely that a number of rights (such as the right to property,85 the right to 
freedom of expression, and the limited right to culture in sections 30 and 31 of 
the South African Constitutions) will weigh heavily in the elaboration of this 
statutory scheme.86 It is, however, the right to property that would have the 
greatest impact given the widespread recognition that communal property is 
contemplated as part of the right to property.87 It is important to recognize that 
 
81. See Enyinna S. Nwauche, The Judicial Construction of the Public Interest in South 
African Copyright Law, 39 INT’L R. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 917, 921 (2008); see, e.g., 
Laugh it Off Promotions CC v. South African Breweries, (42/04) SA 1 (CC) at ¶17 (S. Afr.).  
82. Intellectual Property Amendment Act 28 of 2013 Preamble (S. Afr.).   
83. See, e.g., Performers Protection Act No. 11 of 1967 §§ 2, 3 (S. Afr.); Copyright Act No. 
98 of 1978 § 1 (S. Afr.); Trade Marks Act No. 194 of 1993 § 43(2) (S. Afr.); Designs Act No. 195 of 
1993, §§ 1(1), 1(20) (S. Afr.).  
84. National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act No. 10 of 2004 § 81(1)(a) (S. 
Afr.). 
85. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 25. 
86. Id. at §§30, 31.  
87. See, e.g., Mikhalien Du Bois, Recognition and Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
Interests as Property in South African Law, 2 EUR. PROP. L.J. 144 (2013); Mikhalien Du Bois, 
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the South African framework is not the only statutory framework for the 
protection of communal intellectual property. The Pacific Island countries are 
currently elaborating the protection of traditional knowledge by intellectual 
property rights within the context of the Regional Framework for the 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Culture.88 
To sum up this part, it is clear that the elaboration of the content of the 
right to communal intellectual property will remain a central concern in 
general. In particular, the challenge would be “the balance between heritage 
as a resource for all of humanity and as something that properly belongs to, 
and remains controlled by, its communities of origin.”89 This challenge will 
be in issue more at the national level than anywhere else. 
 CONCLUSION 
The idea that property rights, including intellectual property, can be 
protected as communal property is one that remains controversial and will 
certainly continue to stir heated debates among academics and beyond. Still, 
the recognition of a right to communal property is a fundamental element in 
establishing the entitlement that communities may have in protecting their 
culture and advancing their economic and social identity. In this respect, this 
article has highlighted that the existence, or adoption, of state practices in the 
form of constitutional recognition and statutory protection of a communal 
right to property—and in turn, intellectual property—are crucial to guarantee 
the possibility of creating and guaranteeing such entitlement, and thus such a 
right.  As this Article has noted, it is highly significant that some countries 
have chosen the path of protecting communal property in their national 
statutes and in several instances in their constitutions. Where a national 
constitution or statute does not protect the right to communal property 
directly, the fact that the legal system may provide a right to property can also 
play a crucial role in recognizing and protecting the rights of communal 
property. 
Still, this article has also noted that even where the right to communal 
property is recognized and a community is entitled to claim this right, the 
enforcement of such a right must strike an adequate and equal balance 
between the protection of the communal right and the interests of the public. 
 
Intellectual Property as a Constitutional Property Right: The South African Approach, 24 S. AFR, 
MERCANTILE L.J. 177 (2012). 
88. See Miranda Forsyth, Do You Want it Gift Wrapped?: Protecting Traditional Knowledge 
in the Pacific Island Countries, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PATHWAYS TO DEVELOPMENT 189, 189 (Peter Drahos & Susy Frankel eds., 2012).  
89. See Michael F. Brown, Heritage Trouble: Recent Work on the Protection of Intangible 
Cultural Property, 12 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 40, 49 (2005). 
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With respect to the right to communal intellectual property, this balance 
includes crafting a balanced system that permits, with limitations and 
exceptions, the access to the knowledge, materials, processes, and products 
that are comprised within the communal intellectual property rights, and also 
to members of the public, that is, people from outside the community. 
Without this balance, an overprotective framework may act against the 
widespread acceptance of the right to communal property on the one side, and 
it may negatively affect innovation, creativity, and development on the other. 
 
